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Abstract 
Free will is an apparent paradox because it requires a historical identity to escape its history in a 
self-guided fashion. Philosophers have itemized the design features necessary for this escape, 
scaling from action to agency and vice versa. These can be organized into a coherent framework 
that neurocognitive capacities provide and that form a basis for neurocognitive free will. These 
capacities include 1) adaptive access to unpredictability, 2) tuning of this unpredictability in the 
service of hierarchical goal structures, 3) goal-directed deliberation via search over internal 
cognitive representations, and 4) a role for conscious construction of the self in the generation 
and choice of alternatives. This frames free will as a process of generative self-construction, by 
which an iterative search process samples from experience in an adaptively exploratory fashion, 
allowing the agent to explore itself in the construction of alternative futures. This provides an 
explanation of how effortful conscious control modulates adaptive access to unpredictability and 
resolves one of free will’s key conceptual problems: how randomness is used in the service of 
the will. The implications provide a contemporary neurocognitive grounding to compatibilist and 
libertarian positions on free will and demonstrate how neurocognitive understanding can 
contribute to this debate by presenting free will as an interaction between our freedom and our 
will. 
 
Keywords: free will; executive function; cognitive control; self; foraging; consciousness; 
libertarianism; compatibilism 
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1.0 Introduction 
Free will can be defined as the ability to be free from one’s past and yet to simultaneously act in 
accordance with one’s will. This is an apparent paradox because it requires that free will be an 
ahistorical process governed by a historical identity. The goal of this article is to show that by 
grounding the design features of free will called for by philosophers in a contemporary 
understanding of neurocognitive capacities we can resolve this paradox and understand how free 
will could work in a neurocognitive system.  
The design features of free will have been proposed by two primary philosophical camps: the 
compatibilists—who hold that free will is compatible with a deterministic universe—and the 
libertarians—who hold that free will is compatible with an indeterministic universe. The 
classical compatibilists (such as Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz, Mill, and Hume), claim that an agent 
has free will if it could have done otherwise. The neo-compatibilists (such as Frankfurt, Watson, 
and Bratman) claim that an agent has free will when lower order desires are aligned with higher 
order desires, sometimes called “wanting what you want”, which invokes a hierarchy of wants 
and volitions that some argue presupposes a wanting ‘self’. The libertarians (such as Descartes, 
Berkeley, and Kant) claim that an agent has free will if this conscious self can rationally escape 
the causal certainties of determinism (Kane, 1998; Searle, 2013).  
Discussions of free will have thus far failed to describe how these requirements could be met by 
a neurocognitive system. This has faltered progress on understanding how free will could work 
and enfeebled our understanding of ourselves at the same time. As a result, many have 
provocatively claimed that free will is an illusion because unconscious neural activity at least 
sometimes precedes or influences conscious activity (Crick & Clark, 1994; Wegner, 2002; Burns 
& Bechara, 2007). If consciousness is bypassed in the decision making process then the worry is 
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“that the causal chain leading up to our actions bypasses the self” (Knobe and Nichols 2011), 
eliminating the kind of free will that many people want (Dennett, 2003; Nahmias, 2015).  Indeed, 
many of these provocative claims point to unconscious ‘bottom-up’ control and use it to argue 
that a system has no conscious ‘top-down’ control (for a variety of arguments on both sides see 
Wegner, 2002; Baumeister, 2008; Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele, 2011; Caruso, 2012; Roskies, 
2012; Murphy, Ellis, & O’Connor, 2009).  
However, without an explanation of how a biological system could satisfy the design features of 
free will, we risk logical fallacies based on mistaking parts of the system for the whole. To 
overcome this, we first need to understand how free will could work as a set of neurocognitive 
processes. We can then assess free will in relation to an operationalized architecture that is 
grounded in biological reality—treating free will as a quantitative trait (Brembs 2011; Lavazza 
2016).  
Before getting to the design features, it is useful to first define what I mean by conscious control 
as we will revisit this idea throughout. Conscious control processes are effortful, they focus 
attention in the face of interference, they experience information in a serial format (one thing at a 
time), they can generate solutions that are not hard-wired, and they operate over a constrained 
cognitive workspace—working memory—to which ‘we’ have access and can later report on as a 
component of conscious awareness (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; Dehaene & Naccache, 
2001; Baddeley, 2007; Ardila, 2016; Haggard, 2008). When additional tasks are added to 
consciously effortful tasks performance suffers. Effortful processes sit in contrast to automatic 
processes, which are fast, parallel, and do not require conscious awareness. Effortful tasks can be 
made automatic through repetition (like reading and driving; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) and 
when they become automatic they suffer less from the addition of a secondary task. Effortful and 
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automatic processes are typically thought to sit at opposite ends of a continuum and the evidence 
provided below shows that they can influence one another. 
The relationship between effortful processing (sometimes called executive processing) and 
conscious control is well documented (e.g., Wheeler et al., 1997; Baddeley, 2007; Christensen et 
al., 2016). If we identify effortful consciousness with the self and this effortful self plays a role in 
satisfying the design features of free will discussed in further detail below, then what people 
mean by and want from free will is satisfied by our neurocognitive capacities. 
2.0 Adaptive Behavioral Variability: The Principle of Alternative Possibilities 
One of the central tenets of free will held by many philosophers, biologists, legal institutions, and 
common intuition alike is that for an organism to be free it must be the case that it could have 
done otherwise. This principle of alternative possibilities is a core feature of Hobbesian 
compatibilism (Hobbes, 1656). Though some modern views claim that this kind of freedom is 
irrelevant to free will (Frankfurt 1971), many still hold that it is necessary and even sufficient 
(Kane, 1998; Heisenberg, 2009; Brembs, 2011).  
In order to understand how a cognitive system could generate alternatives, it is first necessary to 
establish that these alternatives exist.  In this section I will describe the evidence for alternative 
generation. In the next section I will discuss where the variability underlying these alternatives 
originates and how it is controlled. The key point is that organisms can adaptively tune the 
behavioral variability necessary to generate alternatives and that at least in humans this is aided 
by processes associated with conscious effortful control. 
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Behavioral variability refers to an organism’s ability to produce a variety of alternative responses 
to the same circumstances, situation, or stimuli. There are at least two frequently encountered 
situations in which this is adaptive: engaging in exploration and outwitting adversaries. 
Exploration 
Exploration is necessary when solutions to problems are unknown or inadequate and there is not 
time or the cognitive capacity to systematically examine all the possibilities. In these cases, 
behavioral variability allows organisms to explore the solution space by trying out different 
alternatives. In doing so, behavioral variability allows organisms to identify and track favorable 
locations in the fitness space more quickly than genetic adaptation alone (Hinton & Nowlan, 
1987).  
When organisms forage in resource environments that are clumpy (spatially or temporally 
autocorrelated) tunable search strategies mediate the trade-off between exploration and 
exploitation by, for example, adding or subtracting variability from their turning angle. This 
allows organisms to track resource density even when they do not know exactly where the 
resources are (Plank & James, 2008; Viswanathan, Luz, & Raposo, 2011). A relatively low-
complexity example is the run-and-tumble behavior of Escherichia coli, which moves up 
resource gradients by randomly choosing a new direction if the current direction is moving the 
bacterium into a lower quality environment (Macnab & Koshland, 1972). Area-restricted search 
is a similar behavior found across metazoans (e.g., vertebrates and invertebrates), with organisms 
restricting search around locations where they have recently found resources but expanding the 
range over which random directions are explored when the present environment becomes 
undesirable (Bell, 1991; Hills, 2006).  
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This is useful in problem solving as well. When a solution is unavailable because of ignorance of 
the causal architecture of the environment, organisms often try effectively random solutions. A 
classic example is the hungry cats Edward Thorndike placed in locked puzzle boxes (Thorndike, 
1898). To escape and gain access to food, the cats initially tried random sequences of actions. 
After gaining experience with a box, behavior became more systematic and the cats escaped 
more quickly. In a more extreme example, by rewarding porpoises for novel actions they had 
never before taken, Pryor, Haag, and O’Reilly (1969) were able to put exploration of new 
behavior under stimulus control, making novel behavior the solution to a consistent stimulus (see 
also Neuringer & Jensen, 2010).  
Animals often need to maintain exploration even in the face of existing solutions. Sometimes this 
is because environments change over time (Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; 
Stephens & Krebs, 1987). Other times it is because finding good solutions requires sufficient 
exploration of the alternatives (Worthy, Gorlick, Pacheco, Schnyer, & Maddox, 2011). In a 
standard decision making paradigm called the Iowa Gambling Task people repeatedly choose 
cards from four decks and receive differing amounts of money depending on the value of each 
choice (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994). Two decks are good and two decks are bad. The 
bad decks do better than the good decks most of the time, leading most people to initially favor 
them. But they are occasionally associated with large losses, making them worse in the long run. 
To solve this problem, exploratory behavior must be maintained even when preliminary evidence 
suggests the presence of “better” solutions.  
Critical to neurocognitive free will, the modulation of exploration also extends to exploration in 
internal environments. Retrieving information from memory often requires that one be able to 
retrieve a variety of answers to the same question. This aids in convergent search—searching for 
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a unique solution such as remembering a person’s name or a word that is common to EVENING, 
LIGHT, and SHOOTING—as well as divergent search—searching for as many solutions as 
possible, such as items on a shopping list or novel uses for an object (Smith, Huber, & Vul, 
2013; Hills et al., 2015).  
In these tasks—which are typical of cognitive search problems—studies suggest that only one 
idea or memory comes into the workspace of consciousness at a time. As a result, effortful 
control processes are used to manage the scope over which search operates. This allows 
individuals to retrieve more or less similar items, producing more or less coherent sequences of 
recalled information (Rosen & Engle, 1997; Unsworth & Engle, 2007; Hills, Mata, Wilke, & 
Samanez-Larkin, 2013).  
The modulation of internal scope is a kind of area-restricted search in a high-dimensional space 
that can be characterized as activation patterns in a distributed representation, such as a 
connectionist or neural network. Such a search can present varying activation patterns as a probe 
(the question or goal) and then explore patterns of activation in the representation for matches 
(solutions). The information in the representation is unconscious until it is made conscious by the 
act of retrieving it and it will be more or less predictable in relation to other knowledge 
depending on the constraints on exploration. 
Outwitting adversaries 
Game theoretic situations between two adversaries often require mixed strategies for which 
success depends on being unpredictable. John Maynard Smith (1982) provides the example of 
two predatory wasps that compete over a hole to lay their eggs. Exposed to a constant threat of 
injury, each wasp must determine how long to fight over the hole. Maynard Smith demonstrated 
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that the best strategy in this kind of situation is a mixed strategy, with individuals drawing their 
time in combat from a distribution of values, but not letting their adversary know the outcome of 
their choice. This is an evolutionary stable strategy because one individual cannot use 
information about the other individual’s strategy to decide their own. Penalty kick locations in 
soccer obey a similar logic of unpredictability (Chiappori, Levitt, & Groseclose, 2002). 
Outwitting adversaries may even require that individuals be capable of being unpredictable even 
to themselves (Trivers, 2011). 
Being too predictable is a problem. Prey that behave too predictably are more likely to become 
the meals of predators who can exploit that predictability. In elegant work describing animal 
solutions to the Hobbesian capacity to do otherwise, Brembs (2011) describes a variety of 
invertebrates that use randomly initiated evasive maneuvers to escape predation or are 
alternatively exploited because of predictable behavior. Cockroaches, for example, select from a 
repertoire of random directions when escaping predators (Domenici, Booth, Blagburn, & Bacon, 
2008). Extending this defensive taxonomy to mammals, LeDoux and Daw (2018) elaborate on 
the neural mechanisms underlying defensive behavior and show its relation to goal-directed 
behavior and consciousness, two design features of free will which I discuss in subsequent 
sections. 
In modeling many of the behaviors described above, researchers use probabilistic (softmax) 
choice rules that incorporate sensitivity or inverse temperature parameters to modulate variability 
(e.g., Collins & Koechlin, 2012; Sutton & Barto, 1998). Moreover, this modulation is observed 
to change over the course of learning such that choices often become less variable with more 
experience (Yechiam et al., 2005).  
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The above evidence indicates that behavioral variability is adaptive, in the behavioral repertoire 
of a wide variety of organisms, and under internal control–with organisms able to increase or 
decrease variability in response to context. Understanding where this variability originates and 
what it gives an organism access to in the service of neurocognitive free will are the topics 
addressed next.  
3.0 The Origin and Control of Behavioral Variability 
Whether or not we describe a system as “random” often depends on whether we see it as arising 
from deterministic (pseudo-random) or indeterministic sources. Neurocognitive free will offers 
inroads for each of these sources. There is a finite precision on cognitive abilities, which is a 
result of a trade-off between computational accuracy and the metabolic cost of information 
processing (e.g., Drugowitsch, Moreno-Bote, Churchland, Shadlen, & Pouget, 2012). This can 
lead to sensory noise when information from external stimuli is transformed into a neural 
representation (Brunton, Botvinick, & Brody, 2013; Kaufman & Churchland, 2013). At smaller 
scales, neural precision is limited by channel noise—the random opening and closing of ion 
channels—and synaptic noise—derived from probabilistic vesicle release and the random motion 
of ligand-gated ion channels (White, Rubinstein, & Kay, 2000). 
The above mentioned compatibilist sources of noise are consistent with a deterministic universe 
and may be all that cognition has access to when it turns up the noise. Nonetheless, a complete 
discussion of neurocognitive free will cannot yet discount the possibility that neural systems 
amplify quantum indeterminism (Hobbs, 1991; Koch, 2009; Brembs, 2011). Neural systems are 
commonly characterized as having a sensitive dependence on initial conditions of arbitrarily 
small size (Garson, 1995; Kitzbichler, Smith, Christensen, & Bullmore, 2009). If ‘arbitrarily 
small’ includes quantum level influences (see Chua, 2014; Chua, Sbitnev, & Kim, 2012; Koch, 
  NEUROCOGNITIVE FREE WILL  11 
2009), then two brains wired such that they would forever remain identical in a deterministic 
universe could eventually diverge in an indeterministic universe.  
Perhaps ironically, neurocognitive free will localizes the volumes that have been written 
comparing compatibilist and libertarian free will to this rather subtle distinction of where the 
noise comes from. This may not matter for adaptive purposes (Taylor & Dennett, 2011). Unless 
my adversary has the omniscience of Laplace’s demon—who can perfectly predict all 
deterministic futures—then the ability to amplify quantum noise is not ultimately necessary (in 
an evolutionary sense), though it may nonetheless satisfy architectural constraints on building 
minds like ours. 
What matters more for free will is where the decision to modulate variability comes from. If 
conscious control in any way influences unpredictability, then consciousness is in the loop that 
governs future behavior. One way to examine this is to investigate the ability to generate 
unpredictable behavior when conscious control is impaired. Consider random number sequence 
generation tasks, where people are asked to produce unpredictable sequences (e.g., Spatt & 
Goldenberg, 1993). If individuals in a random sequence generation task are simultaneously 
exposed to another task that competes for effortful attention—such as n-back tasks requiring 
memory for an ever-changing sequence of letters—their random sequences become increasingly 
predictable (e.g., Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998; Brugger, Monsch, Salmon, & 
Butters, 1996). People under time pressure or who suffer from unwanted thoughts also produce 
more predictable sequences (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012), as do individuals with impairment in 
areas of the brain associated with executive control (Artiges et al., 2000; Wiegersma, van der 
Scheer, & Hijman, 1990; Spatt & Goldenberg, 1993). This evidence strongly implicates effortful 
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conscious control in the mediation of unpredictability, whatever its source.1 The question we 
now face is how this unpredictability is used in the service of the will. 
4.0 Hierarchical Goals and Wanting What You Want 
Neo-compatibilist theories require that for you to have free will you must “want what you want”. 
This is often interpreted as having higher-order wants that can select among lower-order wants. 
Frankfurt (1971) elaborated on this idea by postulating a hierarchical theory of free will. In this 
hierarchy, second-order volitions have preferences over first-order desires. Theories that involve 
a consistent mapping among a hierarchy of desires are called mesh theories. They claim that 
when desires at different levels in the cognitive system “mesh in a harmonious way, then the 
person acts unimpeded; her actions and the desires or intentions causing them are a free outcome 
of her exercising her own agency” (p. 177, McKenna, 2011).  
By invoking higher-order agency, mesh theories emphasize the importance of an enduring 
historical agent from which desires, values, and preferences originate. For example, Watson’s 
structural theory is a mesh theory that requires a mapping between a low-level motivational 
system and a high-level value system, so that agents can want what they value (Watson, 1975). 
Bratman’s (1987) planning theory proposes that free agents maintain higher-order volitions over 
long periods of time.  
                                                
1 This offers an entry point for free will into the Libet et al. (1983) studies. A common 
interpretation of these studies is that because people only become consciously aware of a 
decision after a random unconscious process ‘decides,’ consciousness is not involved in decision 
making (e.g., Caruso, 2012). This only recognizes one direction of the two-way interaction 
between conscious and unconscious processes. Neurocognitive free will predicts that 
consciousness initiates the unconscious random process in the first place in roughly the same 
way it would initiate an exploratory search for names for a new puppy.  
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The need for higher-order agency in mesh theories led Susan Wolf to label them as the real self 
view. Mesh theories implicitly require the existence of a unified top-level identity, which we 
notionally think of us as the self (Wolf, 1993). How this top-level identity is formed is  central to 
understanding neurocognitive free will. First, however, we will examine the neurocognitive 
evidence for hierarchical control. 
Cognitively represented goals lie above automatic responses and drive goal-directed behavior. 
Neuroscientists consider behavior goal-directed if it involves the neural representation of a goal 
that is not maintained by external stimuli (Winstanley et al., 2012). For example, in the match-to-
sample task, an animal is required to remember the features of a target object, during a period 
when it is not present, which they must later identify. Studies involving the match-to-sample task 
demonstrate that goal-directed behavior involves the prefrontal cortex and that damage to this 
area leads to impaired performance (Goldman-Rakic, 1995). 
Hierarchical goal representations allow for one to maintain high level goals while exploring over 
subgoals (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Botvinick, 2008; Winstanley et al., 2012). An individual 
can represent the goal of “making coffee” while activating subgoals such as heating water, 
locating coffee grounds, finding a cup, and so on. When a subgoal remains unresolved (“Where 
is the milk?”), goal maintenance allows for an increase in cognitive variability to search over 
alternative subgoals (“I could go to the store or have it black.”). Regions of the prefrontal cortex 
are activated when individuals maintain a top-level goal while actively processing subgoals 
(Koechlin, Basso, Pietrini, Panzer, & Grafman, 1999; Miller & Cohen, 2001). 
Computational simulations of goal-directed cognition routinely invoke hierarchical goal 
structures (Newell & Simon, 1972; Anderson & Lebiere, 2014). Goals and the motivations that 
drive them are updated based on integrated contextual information, which can arise from external 
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or unconscious processes (such as a growing hunger during a mid-afternoon presentation) or 
conscious plans  (such as the deliberate plan to eat ahead of time). In doing so, the system is put 
in control of itself (Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2006; Hills et al., 2010). As Vancouver (2005) has 
carefully argued, we do not need to invoke a homunculus—a little person in our head—to 
generate control theory level explanations of behavior and motivation. There is no need for an 
agent within the agent. Even though aspects of the system are capable of conscious self-report 
and can operate on other parts of the system, they can be operated on in return. To use 
Gazzaniga’s (2012) example, as enzymes can modulate the genes that encode them, effortful 
consciousness can modulate the unconscious processes that influence it.  
At this point we have identified neurocognitive faculties that modulate between exploration and 
exploitation in the pursuit and satisfaction of hierarchical goals. Conscious executive function 
operates at both ends of the continuum between goal maintenance—exploitation—and 
alternative generation—exploration. In the next section we examine how this enables 
deliberation.  
5.0 Deliberation 
According to Wolf (1993) “One wants to be able to choose in light of the knowledge of one’s 
options and in light of the comparative reasons for and against these options” (p. 92). Wolf 
(1993) claimed that these reasons are acquired through rational deliberation. This involves 
investigating alternatives to satisfying a goal and accessing cognitive information about those 
alternatives. Evidence for this was provided above in relation to memory retrieval from 
distributed representations.  But the evidence goes much further. 
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Using electrical recording from hippocampal place cells—which are active when animals are in 
specific locations—neuroscientists observe that animals selectively replay patterns of neural 
activation associated with past experiences (Pezzulo, van der Meer, Lansink, & Pennartz, 2014). 
One of the earliest of these studies showed that spatiotemporal patterns of activation in the 
hippocampus that occurred while awake were later replayed during sleep, as apparent “dreams” 
(Skaggs & McNaughton, 1996). Researchers now routinely observe neural replay like this in 
awake animals prior to decision making, what is called episodic future thinking (e.g., Foster & 
Wilson, 2006; Diba & Buzsáki 2007; Carr, Jadhav, & Frank, 2011). 
When animals experience a choice point in a decision paradigm this replay of neural activation 
sweeps ahead in a way that corresponds to a spatially congruent series in front of the animal’s 
actual position. These terminate with activity in the ventral striatum—associated with reward 
valuing—in proportion to the animal’s past experiences of rewards along that route (Johnson, 
van der Meer, & Redish, 2007). Alternative routes can be explored during this replay period, but 
only one route is explored at a time (Pezzulo et al., 2014). Novel routes can also be explored, 
creatively constructing experiences from piecemeal information about past experiences (Pfeiffer 
& Foster, 2013), corresponding to our common understanding of deliberation.  
The scope of this deliberation is tuned to the demands of the context. Episodic future thinking is 
highest when animals have limited experience with an environment. With additional experience, 
animals activate fewer forward sweeps and begin to take more favored routes (Johnson et al., 
2007). Episodic future thinking also activates longer sweeps to reach goals that are further away, 
suggesting that it is activated in pursuit of specific goals (Wikenheiser & Redish, 2015).  
These deliberations represent different possible future selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986). People 
use the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex, among other areas, to imagine these future events 
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(Buckner, 2010) and this activation directly precedes decision-making (Peters & Büchel, 2010). 
Correspondingly, patients with hippocampal damage, like H.M. (Scoville, 1968) and D.B. 
(Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002) explicitly report difficulties in imagining future events (see 
also Tulving, 1985). Additionally, Haggard (2008) has argued that other areas strongly 
associated with volition, such as the pre-supplementary motor area, are associated with 
consciousness prior to actions, inhibition of automatic responses, and the flexibility necessary to 
achieve challenging goals by creatively combining elementary actions into complex 
constructions. Conscious goal maintenance would therefore appear to guide deliberation and 
allow comparative exploration of alternatives based on their anticipated outcomes. 
In sum, neurocognitive processes have the capacity to deliberate over alternative courses of 
action using goal-directed exploration of alternatives constructed from internal representations.  
6.0 Constructing the Self 
Scientific research has produced no shortage of entities which we may consider the self. Broadly 
speaking, these are well classified by James’ (1890) division of self-knowledge into the 
experience of “I” and the awareness of “me.” The “I” is composed of pre-reflective experiences 
associated with cortical midline structures—the efference copy—which may allow individuals to 
coordinate action across the body (Block, 1995; Panksepp, 1998; Metzinger, 2004). “Me” is 
something of which we are reflectively aware. It is composed of thoughts about ourselves, which 
include memories and simulated future events. It is sometimes called access or autonoetic 
consciousness and, when maintained over time, gives rise to the narrative or remembering self 
(Neisser & Fivush, 1994; Block, 1995; Wheeler et al., 1997; Gallagher, 2000). For the purposes 
of free will, “I” is insufficient. When we experience our bodies acting in contrast to our 
conscious desires we do not consider ourselves to be acting of “our” own accord. Rather, it is 
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only when our “I” does the bidding of “me” that we consider our actions to originate from our 
self and to be of our own free will. 
Where does the capacity for thinking about “me” come from? Dawkins (2016) suggested the 
following:  
“Survival machines that can simulate the future are one jump ahead of survival 
machines who can only learn on the basis of overt trial and error…The evolution of 
the capacity to simulate seems to have culminated in subjective 
consciousness…Perhaps consciousness arises when the brain’s simulation of the 
world becomes so complete that it must include a model of itself” (p. 59).  
Churchland (2002) proposed similarly that representing the world involves a representation of 
one’s self. There is growing evidence to support this view.  
Consider the following problem. A host of neuroimaging studies show that brains can activate 
neural structures associated with action while suppressing execution of that action (Barsalou, 
2008; Hesslow, 2012; Meister et al., 2004). But if this is the case, then adaptive cognition 
requires distinguishing between real and simulated experiences of the self. Cognitive 
architectures that fail to do this reality monitoring create false memories, delusions, and 
hallucinations (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Morrison, 2001; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Mitchell & 
Johnson, 2009). Indeed, we routinely fail to make this distinction during dreams. The ability to 
do this at all gives rise to the autonoetic experience of “me.” Hills and Butterfill (2015) labeled 
the process that allows one to distinguish between simulator and simulated as a self-actuating 
model. It is a knowledge of what is and what is not the ‘actual’ self.  
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This brings us to a central point in the free will debate: The effortful conscious processes that an 
organism experiences as the self making the decision are informed by the evidence for 
alternatives constructed during deliberation. They are informed because one does not have to 
identify with everything that comes to mind. Processes of effortful conscious control that go by 
the name of executive inhibition allow us to explicitly avoid acting on everything that comes to 
mind (Miyake et al., 2000). Effortful conscious processes can demand a stream of novel 
constructions until something better comes along. 
Though effortful conscious processes are undoubtedly an emergent outcome of multiple 
underlying contributors, they are not just an interpreter of upward causation (Gazzaniga’s, 2012). 
Through inhibition and goal-directed queries, they construct the self and its alternatives. These 
alternatives are sampled by ourselves from ourselves. They are not random alternatives 
introduced from outside the system, but effortful random access to alternatives constructed from 
our own prior experiences. 
The material for these constructed deliberations are sampled in proportion to their past frequency 
of occurrence and how well they match the present situation over which we are deliberating 
(Sanborn & Chater, 2016). This self-sampling is the basis of the empirically supported self-
perception theory (Bem, 1972; Johansson, Hall, Tärning, Sikström & Chater, 2014), which posits 
that we construct attitudes, preferences, and emotions by observing our own past behavior. 
Because the self is sampled more or less stochastically in proportion to the size of the net thrown 
by effortful consciousness, we may never sample the same self twice. The self is constructed in 
real time in response to the present circumstances (Chater, 2018).  
A key prediction of this framework is that damage to areas of the brain associated with internal 
sequence generation (i.e., the hippocampus) should also be associated with an impaired sense of 
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self. Indeed, patients with hippocampal damage report having a degraded sense of self (Corkin, 
2002; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). For any healthy individual, whatever choice 
is made following deliberation is supported by evidence from the sampled construction of   
memory, which we identify as a product of the self.  
7.0 Discussion 
At Darwin College in 1977, Karl Popper gave the first Darwin Lecture. In it he said that he had 
changed his mind about free will: “The selection of a kind of behavior out of a randomly offered 
repertoire may be an act of choice, even an act of free will…the selection may be from some 
repertoire of random events, without being random in its turn.” (p. 348, Popper, 1978). 
Two-stage accounts of free will like Popper’s have been variously proposed for compatibilist and 
libertarian accounts (e.g., Dennett, 1984; Kane, 1985). The problem has been understanding how 
agents might use Popper’s “repertoire of random events” without losing themselves in the 
process. Neurocognitive free will provides a solution: randomness is wielded by the self on the 
self, both in generating internal representations and in choosing among them. Effortful conscious 
processes differentially access material from unconscious representations, creatively construct 
alternatives, value them, and then choose among these different possible future selves. As a 
consequence, neurocognitive free will offers a dignity to both the history of the self and the 
liberty of its alternatives. 
By grounding free will in a neurocognitive reality, neurocognitive free will makes numerous 
contributions to our understanding of free will. First, it provides a neurocognitive basis for the 
design features of free will set out by prominent philosophical accounts. These include the 
capacity to do otherwise, the maintenance of hierarchical goal structures that allow an individual 
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to want what they want, and the capacity for deliberation to search over alternative futures and 
reconstruct a historical identity that selects among those alternatives. In humans at least, these 
features have properties associated with effortful conscious function, which facilitates the 
injection of some form of randomness into cognition, the maintenance of goals, and the 
inhibition of automatic actions necessary to sample alternatives through deliberation. In doing so, 
neurocognitive free will provides an answer to the paradox set out in the introduction as to how a 
historical agent can gain degrees of release from its history and do so in a self-governed fashion.  
Neurocognitive free will also provides the neurocognitive architecture necessary to answer the 
call for free will as a quantitative trait grounded in a naturalistic understanding of modern 
science (Brembs, 2011; Baumeister, 2008). Indeed, the features described here combined with 
future capacities for quantum exploration would give robots a variety of libertarian free will (see 
Briegel, 2012, for further exploration of this fascinating idea).  
This architecture demonstrates that in actualizing free will one must trade-off the will—the 
coherence of the constructed self-sampled identity—with freedom—the deliberate introduction 
of randomness into the construction process. At the ends of this trade-off, we have either no 
freedom or no will. Many arguments for and against free will have focused on exactly these 
extremes, to little effect. What neurocognitive free will shows us is that to resolve the paradox—
to have the “free” and the “will”—one must allow the causal constraints of the past and their 
deliberate subversion to exist at the same time. Possibly in doing so, neurocognition employs 
Hobesian free will to better enjoy Frankfurtian free will, but much more needs to be said here. 
Neurocognitive free will thus highlights the importance of moving beyond free will as a binary 
trait that does or does not exist. Attempting to shoehorn a quantitative trait into a categorical 
definition leads to paradoxical conclusions that violate the intuitions of people on all sides of the 
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issue (Nahmais, 2012; Dennett, 2003; Caruso, 2012).  Neurocognitive free will addresses this by 
reframing free will as a group of individually adaptive traits, which collectively represent a 
process of generative self-construction—goal-directed exploration of alternative future selves 
that are constructed by the agent from the agent in a creative process akin to the generative 
construction of language.  
Variations of the traits underlying neurocognitive free will satisfy different definitions of free 
will to different degrees. These variations invite us to ask how different individuals may have 
more or less free will based on differential capacities for a coherent will in the form of a self-
identity, goal maintenance in the face of distractions, a rich cognitive representation capable of 
offering the materials necessary to compose a wide degree of alternatives, and potentially even 
different degrees of access to indeterminism. 
When access to indeterminism exists—now or in the future (Briegel, 2012)—neurocognitive free 
will allows organisms to explore alternatives that are not causally necessitated by history and 
choose among them from the view of a rational self. No antecedent event requires just that 
action, nor is that action chosen outside the sovereignty of a conscious rational self.  
By satisfying these two capacities neurocognitive free will provides a mechanism for one of the 
most challenging requirements of free will, what libertarians call self-forming actions. Self-
forming actions are required for an organism to escape its own history and do so in a self-guided 
fashion in an indeterministic world where alternative actions are genuinely possible without any 
historical differences (Kane, 1985; Dennett, 2003). The difficulty with this requirement has been 
that prior work could not provide a satisfactory answer as to how the indeterminism necessary to 
generate these alternatives could be put to use by the self (e.g., Dennett, 2003; Koch, 2009). 
Neurocognitive free will shows that deliberation uses conscious cognitive control to modulate 
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the degree of random—and possibly indeterministic—sampling from unconscious 
representations. In other words, controlled access to a random process is what makes the 
alternative versions of our future selves possible. 
Neurocognitive free will also provides the capacity to rationally support different possible 
alternative futures. As Kane (1998) suggests, what we want from free will is the power to go 
more than one way “…rationally and deliberately, rather than flukishly, given exactly the same 
prior deliberation and thought processes” (p. 108). In neurocognitive free will the ‘deliberation 
and thought processes’ are where the more-than-one-way rationality happens—our rationale is 
generated in tandem with the alternatives constructed from our cognitive representations.  
Even if what comes to mind is influenced by indeterminism, it does not go without consideration 
by more willful processes (Mele, 1996). An individual does not get lucky by making a decision 
consistent with their identity as some critics of libertarianism have claimed (Mele, 2008; Caruso, 
2012). Healthy individuals always make the choice most consistent with their identity because 
they construct that identity in the process of deliberation. 
To close, let me point out that the feeling of freedom necessarily comes in part from not knowing 
ahead of time what we are going to do. Velleman (1989) calls this epistemic freedom. It is this 
lack of knowing, caused by discovering different versions of oneself as one goes along, that has 
led many to suggest there was no ‘real’ self in the system to begin with—and therefore no free 
will. The present accounting turns this thinking on its head. It does so by suggesting it is exactly 
the finding out—the initiation of the search and the choice amongst alternatives—that is the basis 
of the self’s emergent will and its genuine freedom. The bringing forth of a self-identity is the 
evaluation of alternatives through self-simulation. If a historical self emerges through conscious 
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deliberation, and that deliberation involves simulation of alternative futures over which the self 
chooses, then a historical identity and the capacity for free choice arise in tandem. 
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